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with their investee firms’ tax avoidance. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we apply three 
identification strategies. First, we implement a two-stage least squares model. Second, we 
perform a difference-in-differences analysis by exploiting China’s legal reform, Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors program, as a quasi-natural experiment. Third, we compare 
changes in corporate tax avoidance in response to a significant increase in FIIs. We further find 
that the negative association is dominated by FIIs from countries with high tax morale and FIIs 
from countries with strong shareholder protection. Finally, we find that the extent of tax morale 
and shareholder protection in the country where an investee firm is located also matters. We 
conclude that FIIs play an active role in shaping investee firms’ corporate tax avoidance policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines whether foreign institutional investors (FIIs) affect their investee 
firms’ tax avoidance. With financial globalization, FIIs have become increasingly important 
financing sources worldwide. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), total 
investment in equity assets by foreign investors rose more than sevenfold since 1990. The rapid 
growth of cross-border institutional investment has spurred considerable attention to the roles 
that FIIs play in their investee firms. An emerging literature finds that, through either direct 
interventions or indirect supply-demand threats, FIIs significantly influence their investee 
firms’ corporate decisions, including cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Ferreira, Massa, 
and Matos 2010), corporate governance (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos 2011), and global 
accounting comparability (Fang, Maffett, and Zhang 2015).  
Since Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)’s call for more research on corporate tax avoidance, 
there are an increasing number of studies that examine how ownership structures affect 
corporate tax avoidance from traditional agency theory perspective (e.g., Chen, Chen, Cheng, 
and Shevlin 2010; Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield 2012; Badertscher, Katz, and Rego 2013; 
McGuire, Wang, and Wilson 2014). Meanwhile, borrowing from the sociology and the 
economic literature, a new stream of studies explore how corporate tax avoidance is affected 
by various social norms, such as religious norms (Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2012) and civic 
norms (Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2016). Furthermore, DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2015) 
show that corporations with owners from countries with higher corruption norms avoid more 
taxes in the U.S., indicating that certain norms could have a cross-border impact on corporate 
tax avoidance. 
Compared to domestic institutional investors (DIIs), FIIs may come from a country 
with different extralegal institutions (e.g., tax morale) and/or different legal institutions (e.g., 
shareholder protection). These different social norms and accustomed governance practices 
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could affect FIIs’ attitudes towards their investee firms’ tax avoidance behaviors. Given that 
FIIs have motivations and abilities to play an active role in influencing investee firms’ decision-
making process because of their independent position and international visibility (e.g., Gillan 
and Starks 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2011), it is natural to expect that FIIs could influence their 
investee firms’ tax avoidance decision to reflect FIIs’ social norms and accustomed governance 
practices of their home countries.  
Coffee (2001) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) point out that extralegal institutions, such 
as social norms, can be important to govern corporate behaviors. Economic literature has 
documented that tax morale, a tax-related social norm, plays an important role in reducing tax 
evasion at both the individual level and the country level (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006; 
Richardson 2006). We conjecture that this intrinsic value of FIIs does not disappear when they 
invest in a different country. Instead, FIIs could use their influence on their investee firms to 
make their social norms spillover to a foreign company. Therefore, we expect that FIIs’ tax 
morale is an important mechanism through which FIIs affect their investee firms’ tax avoidance. 
The influence of FIIs on tax avoidance could also result from their promotion of better 
governance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) point out that shareholder 
protection is crucial to corporate governance, and they document a significant relation between 
strong shareholder protection and effective corporate governance. In line with this argument, 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that strong shareholder protection reduces earnings 
management, and Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012) document a negative impact of 
shareholder protection on corporate tax avoidance. The literature suggests that good 
governance practices to protect shareholders can be exported by FIIs to their investee firms. 
Specifically, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that FIIs from countries with strong shareholder 
protection promote better corporate governance of their investee firms. Therefore, we expect 
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that FIIs’ accustomed governance practices are another mechanism through which FIIs affect 
their investee firms’ tax avoidance. 
Using a sample of 47,749 firm-year observations across 32 countries between 2000 and 
2008, we find that there is a significantly negative relation between FIIs and corporate tax 
avoidance. The result is also economically significant. Specifically, the coefficient estimate of 
FIIs translates into corporate tax avoidance decreasing by, on average, 0.46 percentage points 
(a 9% decrease in relative terms based on the mean value of tax avoidance) when foreign 
institutional ownership increases from 0.25% (the 25th percentile in our sample) to 6.09% (the 
75th percentile in our sample). Given our sample’s mean value of pretax income being 
US$201.27 million, this 0.46% decrease in tax avoidance equates to an increase of US$0.93 
million in tax expenses for an average investee firm in our sample.  
We conduct a battery of tests to show the robustness of our finding. Since our study is 
at the international level, the result may be driven by some omitted country-level characteristics 
instead of FIIs. To mitigate this concern, we add seven additional country-level controls (e.g., 
freedom from corruption, political transparency, regulation quality, and economic development) 
to the baseline model and we find that our main result holds.  
It is also possible that FIIs choose firms with lower tax avoidance to invest, rather than 
that FIIs affect investee firms’ tax avoidance through their interventions or threats after 
investment. To mitigate this endogeneity concern, we conduct three different sets of tests. First, 
following Ferreira et al. (2010), we implement a two-stage least squares model using Morgan 
Stanley Capital International Index as an instrumental variable for FIIs. Second, we perform a 
difference-in-differences analysis by exploiting China’s legal reform, Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors program, which significantly attracts FIIs to the Chinese stock market, 
as a quasi-natural experiment. Third, we compare changes in corporate tax avoidance in 
response to a significant increase (no less than one standard deviation) in foreign institutional 
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ownership. The results from all three sets of tests are consistent with that the direction of the 
effect is from FIIs to investee firms’ tax avoidance. 
Since we argue that the impact of FIIs on their investee firms’ tax avoidance results 
from their different exposure to extralegal institutions (tax morale) and legal institutions 
(shareholder protection), we conduct channel tests to provide supportive evidence on our 
arguments. We find that 1) FIIs from countries with high tax morale play a dominant role in 
reducing investee firms’ tax avoidance; 2) FIIs from countries with strong shareholder 
protection decrease investee firms’ corporate tax avoidance, whereas FIIs from countries with 
weak shareholder protection do not. These findings lend support to our arguments that tax 
morale and good governance practices are plausibly underlying channels through which FIIs 
affect corporate tax avoidance. 
Finally, we find that the extent of tax morale and shareholder protection in the country 
where an investee firm is located also matters. Specifically, we find that DIIs play a dominant 
role in reducing tax avoidance of investee firms that are located in countries with high tax 
morale (strong shareholder protection), while for investee firms that are located in countries 
with low tax morale (weak shareholder protection), only FIIs who are from countries with high 
tax morale (strong shareholder protection) play a significant role. These additional analyses 
suggest that the impact of FIIs on investee firms’ tax avoidance is not homogenous, and it 
depends on the relative strength of the extralegal and legal environment between the FIIs’ home 
countries and their investee firm’s home countries.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, our paper is the first to 
establish a direct effect of FIIs, unique and increasingly important institutional investors, on 
their investee firms’ tax avoidance. Differing from prior studies that mainly focus on how 
incentives/payoffs of different ownership structures affect investee firms’ tax avoidance within 
the country, our paper examines how institutional investors from other countries can transfer 
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their home-country tax norms and accustomed governance practices to their investee firms, and 
thereby impact investee firms’ tax avoidance decision. Thus, our paper complements the 
literature that examines the impacts of ownership structures on corporate tax avoidance and 
provides new insights to understand the determinants of tax avoidance from a global financial 
market perspective. 
Second, we provide evidence of two specific channels – tax morale and governance 
practices – through which FIIs influence investee firms’ tax avoidance. Our results add to the 
new stream of literature that examines the effect of social norms on corporate tax avoidance 
(e.g., Boone et al. 2012; DeBacker et al. 2015; Hasan et al. 2016). We provide evidence of a 
previously undocumented spillover effect of tax related social norms, tax morale, through FIIs 
on investee firms’ tax avoidance. We also provide further evidence that is consistent with 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) that good governance practices (e.g., shareholder protection) do travel 
around the world. 
Third, our paper contributes to the literature by illustrating FIIs’ role in corporate 
policies. Extant literature shows that FIIs affect firm value and performance (Ferreira and 
Matos 2008), financial reporting practices (Fang et al. 2015), corporate governance (Aggarwal 
et al. 2011), and innovation (Luong, Moshirian, Nguyen, Tian, and Zhang 2016). Our study 
extends this stream of research by showing FIIs’ effect on investee firms’ corporate tax 
avoidance decision, one of the most important corporate decisions which has received 
considerable attention from regulators and policymakers internationally.1 Our results have 
important implications for firms with FIIs, investors in the global market, regulators, and 
policymakers around the world.  
                                                          
1 For example, deterring corporate tax avoidance has been one of the core issues at the Group of Twenty (G20) 
summits for the last several years. 
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The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews prior literature and 
develops our hypothesis. Section III describes data in the sample, followed by the outline of 
our research design and analyses in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior literature on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance typically focuses on 
country characteristics and firm characteristics. The literature on country-level determinants of 
tax avoidance (e.g., Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 2008; Atwood et al. 2012; Li, Maydew, 
Willis, and Xu 2016) usually focuses on whether certain country characteristics, such as tax 
system, law enforcement, and political uncertainty, affect corporate tax avoidance within that 
country. The literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Armstrong, Blouin, and Larker 2012) on firm-
level determinants of tax avoidance has grown rapidly in the last decade. One strand of the 
literature that is closely related to our study is the impact of ownership structures, such as 
family ownership, hedge fund ownership, and dual-class ownership, on tax avoidance (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 2012; Badertscher et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 2014). In general, 
these papers study tax avoidance from a traditional agency theory perspective and are 
motivated by incentives/payoffs of different ownership structures. 
Frey (1997) argues that a taxpayer’s decision to pay tax is affected by both extrinsic 
(e.g., potential penalty for tax avoidance) and intrinsic (e.g., tax morale) motivations. Coffee 
(2001) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) point out that extralegal institutions, such as social norms, 
can be important to govern corporate behaviors. Recent studies have begun to examine how 
corporate tax avoidance is affected by social norms, which are incremental to traditional firm-
level and country-level factors. Specifically, Boone et al. (2012) find a significant impact of 
religious norms on corporate tax avoidance. Hasan et al. (2016) study the effect of civic norms 
on corporate tax avoidance, and they find that the levels of civic norms in US counties are 
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negatively related to tax avoidance activities of corporations with headquarters located in those 
counties. DeBacker et al. (2015) find that corporations with owners from countries with higher 
corruption norms avoid more taxes in the U.S. Although informative, these papers do not study 
the direct impact of tax-related social norms, tax morale, on corporate tax avoidance, and do 
not investigate whether tax morale can be exported from one country to another. 
A taxpayer’s intrinsic morale to pay taxes is crucial to his/her tax avoidance decision 
and it can go beyond the legal enforcement (Luttmer and Singhal 2014). Prior economic 
literature shows that tax morale as a social norm plays an important role in reducing tax evasion 
at both the individual level and the country level (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006; Richardson 
2006). We conjecture that the intrinsic tax morale of FIIs does not disappear when they invest 
in different countries. Instead, FIIs could use their influence on their investee firms to make 
their intrinsic value spillover to foreign companies.  
Another channel we expect that could affect investee firms’ tax avoidance is the 
strength of FIIs’ home-country shareholder protection. Shareholder protection is crucial for the 
effectiveness of corporate governance (La Porta et al. 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) argue that strong 
shareholder protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces 
their incentives to mask firm performance through earnings management. Both empirical and 
survey evidence shows that tax avoidance is also a very important strategy that firms employ 
to achieve their financial reporting purpose (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Frank, Lynch, 
and Rego 2009; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2014). In a recent study, Atwood et al. 
(2012) find that strong shareholder protection deters corporate tax avoidance activities. 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) show that FIIs promote good corporate governance, especially 
those FIIs who are from countries with strong shareholder protection (i.e., common-law 
countries). Their result suggests that FIIs from countries with strong shareholder protection 
could get accustomed to good corporate governance practices. Thus, when they invest in 
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foreign firms, they could diffuse those effective governance practices to their investee firms.2 
3 Therefore, to the extent that FIIs bring governance practices (e.g., shareholder protection) 
from their home countries to investee firms, we expect that FIIs could impact their investee 
firms’ tax avoidance through this channel.  
Prior literature shows that FIIs have capacities to influence their investee firms’ 
behaviors through either direct interventions or indirect supply-demand threats (e.g., Gillan 
and Starks 2003; Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011). Gillan and Starks (2003) 
argue that FIIs are likely to play an important and active role in promoting governance change 
due to their independent position and international visibility. Prior literature has shown that 
FIIs aggressively extend their investment globally, thereby increasing their role in corporate 
decision-making process. For instance, FIIs encourage firms to engage in cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (Ferreira et al. 2010), promote improvement in corporate governance 
(Aggarwal et al. 2011), increase accounting comparability across international financial 
markets (Fang et al. 2015), and encourage innovation (Luong et al. 2016).  
In sum, to the extent that FIIs’ country-level tax morale and accustomed governance 
practices affect FIIs’ attitudes towards investee firms’ tax avoidance and that FIIs have 
capacities to influence their investee firms’ corporate decisions, we expect that FIIs 
significantly impact their investee firms’ tax avoidance. However, given the fact that FIIs could 
come from countries with high or low tax morale (strong or weak shareholder protection), we 
do not predict the dominating effect of FIIs on tax avoidance. 
 
                                                          
2 This diffusion channel works similarly to what is documented in the board interlock literature (e.g., Davis 1991; 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou 1993; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby 2009; Brown and Drake 2014). 
3 A recent survey by International Centre for Pension Management shows that the major concerns that FIIs have 
when they invest in the developing countries include quality of financial reporting, quality of boards, quality of 
audits, level of shareholder rights, weak rule of law, and problematic voting procedures.  
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III. DATA AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
3.1. Data 
We obtain data from several sources. International institutional ownership information 
comes from FactSet/LionShares database. FactSet/LionShares database provides detailed 
information about institutional investors’ holdings, names, types, turnover rates, and 
headquarter locations, as well as information on their investee firms’ prices, shares outstanding, 
and locations in international capital markets. FactSet/LionShares database collects data of 
professional money managers, such as mutual funds, pension funds, bank trusts, and insurance 
companies, directly from public sources, i.e., national regulatory agencies, stock exchanges, 
industry directories, and company proxies. International institutional ownership studies in the 
field of accounting and finance have used this dataset as a primary source (e.g., Ferreira and 
Matos 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011). A major drawback of this database, however, is that 
institutional investors report their holdings on different reporting dates with irregular frequency 
across countries. To address this issue, following Ferreira and Matos (2008), we retain only the 
latest institutional ownership for each year. Our firm characteristics including tax avoidance 
information are from Global Compustat, and tax morale index is constructed from the World 
Values Survey (WVS). The final sample includes 47,749 firm-year observations across 32 
countries from 2000 to 2008.4  
 
3.2. Measurements 
3.2.1. Tax Avoidance Measurement 
Following Atwood et al. (2012), we define tax avoidance as “the reduction of explicit 
taxes paid” and use the modified cash effective tax rate calculation from Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
                                                          
4  At institutional level, we include 2,411 institutional investors headquartered in 43 countries for the 
corresponding period. 
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Maydew (2008) as our primary measure of tax avoidance.5 The tax avoidance for firm i at year 
t is calculated as follows: 
 
TaxAvoidi,t =
(PreTaxEarn ∗ T)i,t − TaxPaidi,t
PreTaxEarni,t
   
(1) 
where 
PreTaxEarn = pretax earnings less special items 
T = home-country statutory corporate income tax rate 
TaxPaid = current cash tax paid6 
 
3.2.2. International Institutional Ownership 
We construct a battery of institutional ownership measures using institutional investors’ 
information. Total institutional ownership, Totown, is aggregate institutional investors’ 
holdings divided by shares outstanding for firm i at year t. Foreign institutional ownership, 
Forown, is aggregate FIIs’ holdings divided by shares outstanding for firm i at year t. FIIs are 
defined as institutional investors domiciled in countries different from their investee firms’ 
countries. Foreign institutional ownership coming from countries with high (low) tax morale, 
Forown_HighMorale (Forown_LowMorale), is the aggregate holdings of FIIs whose home 
countries are classified as high-(low-) tax-morale countries. Appendix A contains further 
detailed definitions of other institutional ownership variables.  
 
                                                          
5 We use annual tax avoidance measurement in our baseline model, instead of the three-year average of tax 
avoidance used in Atwood et al. (2012), but we construct robustness tests with two-year and three-year averages 
of tax avoidance. The results are consistent with our baseline result. 
6 Following Atwood et al. (2012), if current cash tax paid is missing, we replace it with total tax expense less 
deferred tax expense. 
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3.2.3. Tax Morale 
The tax morale index is constructed from the World Values Survey (WVS).7 The WVS 
conducts a series of surveys to collect information regarding national culture and/or belief with 
respect to social, economic, and political issues by interviewing at least 1,000 residents in a 
given country in almost 100 countries. To assess tax morale, the WVS asks individuals the 
following question: 
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: … Cheating 
on taxes if you have a chance (on a ten-point scale where 1 is never 
justifiable and 10 is always justifiable” 
WVS data are widely used in many fields such as economics and finance (e.g., Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales 2003, 2008; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Alm and Torgler 2006). Dyck 
and Zingales (2004) use the same question in WVS used in our paper as the proxy for the 
attitude of citizens toward “cheating on taxes” when they examine the association between 
country characteristics and private benefits of control. We call this attitude of citizens towards 
“cheating on taxes” tax morale in our paper. 8 Besides the tax morale questionnaire, other 
questionnaires in WVS have also been used in the literature. For example, Guiso et al. (2008) 
use the one questionnaire of trust in WVS to examine the effect of a general lack of trust on 
stock market participation. 
                                                          
7 Data are available at the webpage via http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp.   
8 While we define tax avoidance as “the reduction of explicit taxes paid” along a spectrum from low to high 
aggressiveness, the tax morale measure is more likely to capture the attitude of citizens toward high aggressive 
tax avoidance by asking the opinions on “cheating on taxes”. We argue that if tax morale measure mismatches tax 
avoidance measure, we should not get any effect of FIIs on tax avoidance through tax morale channel. The fact 
that we get the results indicates otherwise. In addition, we do not use the continuous tax morale measure. Instead, 
we separated countries into high and low tax morale based on the median level of tax morale. This should mitigate 
the noise involved in this measure. Furthermore, as an additional test, we construct high aggressive tax avoidance 
as our dependent variable and repeat the analysis. We find consistent results.  
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Based on the above tax morale questionnaire, we follow Alm and Torgler (2006) and 
construct an individual-level dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent’s answer is 1 
(never justifiable) and 0 otherwise. We then take the percentage of a given country’s individual-
level tax morale scores as its country-level tax morale index ranging from 0 (lowest degree of 
tax morale) to 1 (highest degree of tax morale). To include as many countries as possible, we 
use the most recent three WVS waves (Wave 4, Wave 5, and Wave 6) from 1999 to 2014. If a 
country participates in more than one waves, we average its tax morale indexes. We then divide 
the sample into high-tax-morale and low-tax-morale countries, with the cutoff point being the 
median value of the tax morale index.  
 
3.2.4. Shareholder Protection  
La Porta et al. (2000) point out that shareholder protection is crucial to the quality of 
corporate governance. Following Aggarwal et al. (2011), we use legal origin to proxy 
shareholder protection. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that 
common-law countries, compared with civil-law countries, have stronger investor protection 
and therefore higher corporate governance quality. Forown_CommonLaw (Forown_CivilLaw) 
is the aggregate ownership of FIIs whose home countries are classified as common-law (civil-
law) countries. 
 
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on variables used in our empirical analyses. The 
mean (median) value of tax avoidance is 5.3% (6.2%), similar to Li et al. (2015), who show a 
mean (median) value of tax avoidance of 6.2% (9.0%). Institutional investors hold, on average, 
9.4% of ownership, with approximately 4.7% foreign institutional ownership and 4.8% 
domestic institutional ownership. Our sample firms have average assets of US$2,368 million 
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and leverage (debt to assets) of 20%. During our sample period, the average corporate tax rate 
is about 32% for the 32 countries where investee firms are located. Two thirds of our 32 
countries have civil-law legal origin, and approximately 69% of firms are in developed 
countries.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In Table 2, we tabulate tax avoidance and institutional ownership by country. We also 
divide our sample into two groups: high- and low-tax-morale countries. The mean value of tax 
avoidance for the high-tax-morale group is 4.7%, and the corresponding value for the low-tax-
morale group is 6.1%. The difference in tax avoidance between these two groups is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms in high-tax-morale countries are associated 
with lower levels of tax avoidance. Regarding institutional ownership, both domestic and 
foreign ownership are higher in low-tax-morale countries than in high-tax-morale countries.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
We further examine the relation between a country’s legal origin and tax avoidance. In 
common-law countries, 5 out of 10 are classified as high-tax-morale countries, compared with 
11 out of 22 civil-law countries. We find that the mean value of tax avoidance in common-law 
countries is 4.0% and the corresponding value in civil-law countries is 5.5%; the difference 
between these two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level.9 For brevity, the results 
are not tabulated. 
                                                          
9 We find that the mean value of tax avoidance in developed countries is 2.9% and the corresponding value in 
developing countries is 9.7%, and the difference between these two groups is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Baseline Regression Results: Foreign Institutional Ownership and Tax Avoidance 
In Table 3, we investigate the effect of institutional ownership on tax avoidance. Our 
baseline regression model is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑛 +  𝛼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
+𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛼𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                        (2) 
where 
TaxAvoidi,t = tax avoidance measurement from Model (1) 
InstOwni,t = types of institutional ownership (e.g., Totown, or Domown and Forown, etc.) 
αyear = year fixed effects 
αindustry = industry fixed effects 
αcountry = country fixed effects 
Control = Ln(Size)i,t–1, Leveragei,t, ROAi,t, Sales Growthi,t, R&Di,t, Accruali,t, Tax Ratei,t, 
Foreign Operationsi,t (see Appendix A for detailed information) 
 
In Column (1), we first examine the association between tax avoidance and total 
institutional ownership (Totown). We find that the coefficient on Totown is -0.042, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Economically, our coefficient estimate of Totown 
translates into corporate tax avoidance decreasing by, on average, 0.51% (a 10% decrease in 
relative terms based on the mean value of tax avoidance) when total institutional ownership 
increases from 1.18% (the 25th percentile in our sample) to 13.30% (the 75th percentile). Given 
the mean value of pretax income being US$201.27 million in our sample, this 0.51% decrease 
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in tax avoidance would equal an increase of US$1.03 million in tax expenses for an average 
firm.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
To test how FIIs affect corporate tax avoidance, we split institutional ownership into 
foreign (Forown) and domestic (Domown) institutional ownership. Column (2) reports the 
results. We find that the coefficient on Forown is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Economically, the coefficient estimate of FIIs is –0.080, which translates into corporate 
tax avoidance decreasing by, on average, 0.46% (a 9% decrease in relative terms based on the 
mean value of tax avoidance) when foreign institutional ownership increases from 0.25% (the 
25th percentile in our sample) to 6.09% (the 75th percentile). This 0.46% decrease in tax 
avoidance would equal a US$0.93 million increase in tax expenses by an average firm in our 
sample. For domestic institutional ownership, although the coefficient on Domown is negative, 
it is statistically insignificant. Hence our results indicate that foreign institutional ownership 
plays a dominant role in reducing investee firms’ tax avoidance. 
 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
4.2.1. Do Home-Country Characteristics Matter? 
Although we use country fixed effects in our baseline regression, our results may still 
be driven by omitted country characteristics. In Table 4, we examine how various country 
characteristics could affect our main finding. Extant tax avoidance research builds on the theory 
that a firm determines its level of tax avoidance by trading off potential benefits from tax 
savings with potential risks of being caught by the government (Mills 1998). Thus we focus on 
country characteristics that may affect this trade-off decision. One limitation of international-
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level studies, however, is that proxy variables for certain country characteristics are often 
neither time-variant nor comprehensive. To overcome this problem, following Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), we include interaction terms between country and year in our regressions. We 
thus can test the effect of time-invariant variables, such as legal origin and economic 
development, while controlling for unobservable heterogeneous cross-country effects that 
might affect our findings. 
We first include four country characteristics that affect the strength of legal 
enforcement, the likelihood of a firm being audited by the government, and/or the likelihood 
of it being punished for tax avoidance: legal origin (CivilLaw) from La Porta et al. (1998), 
government effectiveness to enforce the law (GovEffect), the quality of regulations 
(RegQuality), and transparency in politics (Accountability). Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4 report 
the results. We find that three out of the four variables are significantly and negatively 
associated with tax avoidance at the 1% level, and CivilLaw is insignificantly associated with 
tax avoidance. Our results suggest that effective law enforcement and high political 
transparency reduce local firms’ tax avoidance. 
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
We then include an economic development indicator (EconDevelop) that equals 1 for a 
developed country and 0 otherwise. Prior tax research shows that tax evasion is pervasive in 
developing countries (e.g., Richupan 1984; Gillis 1989; Bird and de Jantscher 1992). We find 
that EconDevelop is significantly and negatively associated with tax avoidance at the 1% level, 
consistent with prior studies. 
We further add an index measuring a country’s freedom from corruption (Anti-
Corruption) obtained from the Heritage Foundation. If corruption is high, marginal benefits 
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from tax savings would be greater than marginal cost of punishment imposed on firms for tax 
avoidance as a result of weak enforcement of tax collection and/or lack of government audits. 
As predicted, Anti-Corruption is significantly and negatively associated with tax avoidance at 
the 1% level. Lastly, we include natural logarithm of the investee firms’ home-country tax 
morale (Ln(Tax Morale Index)), and the coefficient on Ln(Tax Morale Index) is also 
significantly negative. More importantly, in all seven regressions, Forown stays significantly 
and negatively associated with tax avoidance at the 1% level. Furthermore, when we add all 
the country-characteristics variables in one regression in Column (8), the coefficient on Forown 
stays significant and negative. Taken together, these results show that our main findings are 
not subsumed by country-level factors that could affect tax avoidance.  
 
4.2.2. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Model 
Our model could suffer from endogeneity. For example, if FIIs prefer to invest in firms 
overseas with low tax avoidance, firms with low tax avoidance may be more likely to have 
high foreign institutional ownership. In addition, although we try to include control variables 
that are found to affect tax avoidance in the literature, our model could still suffer from omitted 
variable bias. We first test if our variable of interest, Forown, is an exogenous variable in our 
baseline model. The F-value for our robust regression is 3.28 (p-value is 0.07). This result 
indicates that our variable of interest is endogenous. Thus, the OLS model may be inefficient. 
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we implement a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
model with instrumental variable (IV). A good IV is correlated with the endogenous variable 
and not directly correlated with the dependent variable. It is correlated with the dependent 
variable only through the endogenous variable. Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that FIIs prefer 
firms listed in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index. Therefore, following 
Ferreira et al. (2010), we use MSCI Inclusion as an instrumental variable for foreign 
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institutional ownership. MSCI Inclusion equals 1 if a given firm is included in MSCI in a given 
year t and 0 otherwise. It is not possible to prove that the instrumental variable is correlated 
with the dependent variable only through the endogenous variable. To test the instrument’s 
validity, we run an F-test and find an F-value of 289.31, indicating that our instrumental 
variable is valid. In addition, to our best knowledge, there is no theoretical or empirical paper 
documenting that inclusion in MSCI index affects firms’ tax avoidance behaviors. 
We then regress tax avoidance on predicted foreign institutional ownership 
(Pred_Forown) from first-stage regression. Table 5 reports the results. We find that MSCI 
Inclusion is significantly and positively associated with foreign institutional ownership at the 
1% level. In the second stage, we find that Pred_Forown is significantly and negatively 
associated with tax avoidance at the 1% level. This result is consistent with our baseline result, 
that is, foreign institutional ownership has a significantly negative effect on tax avoidance. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.2.3. Quasi-Natural Experiment: China’s Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Reform 
In Table 6, we further address endogeneity concerns by exploiting a quasi-natural 
experiment. Many stocks traded on Chinese exchanges offer two types of shares, A share and 
B share. A share is the regular stock, which was available to domestic investors but unavailable 
to foreign investors before 2002. If foreign investors wanted to invest in mainland China’s 
stock market before 2002, they could purchase stocks only through B shares. B shares have the 
same rights as A shares except that Type B shareholders receive dividends in foreign currencies 
(U.S. dollars and Hong Kong dollars). Compared with A shares, the number of B shares was 
limited. In 2002, China’s Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors reform took effect. It 
allowed qualified FIIs to purchase stocks directly through A shares. This reform attracted more 
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FIIs to invest in China’s stock market, which provides us with a good quasi-natural experiment 
setting. 
Because our sample starts in 2000 and the reform happened in 2002, we analyze a [–2, 
2] year window excluding event year, 2002. In an untabulated test, we find that FIIs in China 
increase by 8.63% (from 10.38% to 19.00%) after the reform, and this increase is significant 
at the 1% level. The result confirms an important assumption of our setting: the number of 
shares held by FIIs increases significantly after the legal reform.  
Our difficulty in conducting a difference-in-differences analysis comes from the fact 
that there is no perfect control group of countries to match with China. Given the fact that 
China is a low-tax-morale country, a developing country, and a civil-law country, we choose 
three different sets of control countries based on those three criteria, respectively. If our results 
hold for all three sets of control groups, we could be confident that our results are robust. 
Table 6 reports the results of difference-in-differences regressions using these three 
different sets of control countries. Three variables of interest are China, Post-Reform, and 
China*Post-Reform. China is an indicator that equals 1 if the investee firms’ home country is 
China and 0 otherwise. Post-Reform is an indicator that equals 1 if the observational year is 
after China’s reform year, 2002, and 0 otherwise. China*Post-Reform is the interaction term 
between China and Reform, capturing the post-reform effect on investee firms in China 
compared with control countries. The coefficients on our variable of interest, China*Reform, 
are all negative and significant in Columns (1) to (3), indicating that the significant increase in 
foreign institutional ownership leads to a decrease in tax avoidance in China compared with 
benchmark countries. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Furthermore, we also match China with countries satisfying all of the three criteria: 
being a low-tax-morale country, being a developing country, and being a civil-law country. 
The result is reported in Column (4). The coefficient on China*Reform continues to be negative 
and significant. In sum, our difference-in-differences results mitigate the endogeneity concerns 
and confirm a causal effect of foreign institutional ownership on tax avoidance. 
 
4.2.4. The Effect of Significant Changes in Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance 
Our third identification strategy is a change regression. Specifically, we test how 
corporate tax avoidance changes after institutional ownership significantly increases. To ensure 
a non-negligible effect of changes in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership on corporate 
tax policy, we first identify firms with an increase in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership 
by at least one standard deviation from the previous year to the current year: 1,342 (1,275) 
unique firms for foreign (domestic) institutional investors. We then find matching firms (i.e., 
firms that do not have an increase in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership by at least one 
standard deviation) based on year, industry (i.e., the first three digits of the SIC code), and the 
nearest firm size10. We restrict our analysis to a short window, two years before and after 
changes in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership, to avoid confounding effects. We also 
exclude the year when the increase in institutional ownership happens. 
Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 for years after foreign (domestic) institutional 
ownership increases and 0 otherwise. IncFor (IncDom) is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
firms with an increase in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership by at least one standard 
deviation and 0 otherwise. The interaction term between Post and IncFor (IncDom) captures 
the effect of increased foreign (domestic) institutional ownership between the treatment group 
                                                          
10 The ratio of assets between two firms is bounded by 75% and 125%.  
21 
 
and the control group. This difference-in-differences approach provides us dynamic views to 
compare the effect of changes in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership on tax avoidance.  
The first pair of models test changes in tax avoidance before and after significant 
changes in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership relative to corresponding matched firms 
without control variables. We report the results in Table 7. We find that the level of tax 
avoidance decreases after significant increase in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership 
compared with corresponding matched firms. The coefficient on Post*IncFor (Post*IncDom) 
is –0.025 (–0.034), which are statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level. In the next pair, we 
include control variables used in Table 3. Although the coefficient on Post*IncFor remains 
statistically and economically significant, the coefficient on Post*IncDom becomes 
insignificant. This evidence strongly supports our hypothesis that FIIs drive the reduction in 
investee firms’ corporate tax avoidance. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.3. Exploring Underlying Mechanisms 
Until now, we find that FIIs have a significantly negative effect on investee firms’ tax 
avoidance. In hypothesis development section, we conjecture that social norms (tax morale) 
and accustomed governance practices (shareholder protection) possibly spillover from one 
country to another through FIIs and therefore result in the effect of FIIs on investee firms’ tax 
avoidance. In this subsection, we investigate these two possible mechanisms that could drive 
the negative relation between FIIs and corporate tax avoidance.  
 
4.3.1. Mechanism 1: FIIs’ Home-Country Tax Morale and Tax Avoidance 
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We first examine the effect of FIIs’ home-country tax morale on investee firms’ tax 
avoidance. We separate foreign institutional ownership into two groups based on FIIs’ home-
country tax morale: FIIs headquartered in high-tax-morale countries (Forown_HighMorale) 
and FIIs headquartered in low-tax-morale countries (Forown_LowMorale). In Column (1) of 
Table 8, we find FIIs headquartered in high-tax-morale countries have a significantly negative 
impact on investee firms’ tax avoidance, whereas FIIs headquartered in low-tax-morale 
countries is positively (but not significantly) associated with investee firms’ tax avoidance. Our 
findings indicate that FIIs’ home-country tax morale plays a critical role in shaping investee 
firms’ tax avoidance. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
We further test how investee firms’ home-country tax morale affects our findings. In 
Columns (2) and (3), we examine the effects of Forown on TaxAvoid in low- and high-tax-
morale countries separately. We find different effects of FIIs on investee firms located in 
countries with different levels of tax morale. For investee firms located in low-tax-morale 
countries, the coefficient on Forown is -0.131, statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
investee firms from high-tax-morale countries, however, the coefficient on Forown becomes 
insignificant. To illustrate the economic effects, we find that an increase in Forown from 0.14% 
(the 25th percentile) to 7.12% (the 75th percentile) in low-tax-morale countries reduces tax 
avoidance in investee firms by 0.91% (a 15% decrease in relative terms based on the mean 
value of tax avoidance of investee firms in low-tax-morale countries).  
In Columns (4) and (5), we further extend our test to see the effect of relative differences 
in tax morale between FIIs and their investee firms on tax avoidance. Interestingly, we find 
that for investee firms located in low-tax-morale countries, having FIIs from high-tax-morale 
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countries (Forown_HighMorale) is significantly and negatively associated with tax avoidance 
(TaxAvoid), but the effect of FIIs from low-tax-morale countries (Forown_LowMorale) is 
insignificant. For investee firms located in high-tax-morale countries, FIIs do not affect tax 
avoidance, regardless of whether they are from high- or low-tax-morale countries. Overall, the 
results indicate that the differences in tax-morale levels between FIIs’ home countries and their 
investee firms’ home countries matter, and only FIIs from high-tax-morale countries 
significantly affect tax avoidance of investee firms located in low-tax-morale countries. Our 
results provide evidence that FIIs affect investee firms’ tax avoidance through the mechanism 
of tax morale. 
 
4.3.2. Mechanism 2: FIIs’ Home-Country Governance Practices and Tax Avoidance 
In Table 9, we test how FIIs’ home-country governance practices (shareholder 
protection) could influence their investee firms’ tax avoidance. Extant literature (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al. 2011) shows that FIIs from countries with strong shareholder protection 
enhance corporate governance especially when their investee firms are located in countries 
with weak shareholder protection and therefore lack external corporate governance 
mechanisms. Following Aggarwal et al. (2011), we use legal origin to proxy country-level 
shareholder protection. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that common-law countries, compared with 
civil-law countries, have stronger investor protection and therefore higher corporate 
governance quality. Forown_CommonLaw (Forown_CivilLaw) measures aggregate ownership 
of FIIs whose home countries are classified as common-law (civil-law) countries. We find that 
FIIs from common-law countries (strong-shareholder-protection countries) have a negative 
effect on investee firms’ tax avoidance, and it is significant at the 1% level. In contrast, FIIs 
from civil-law countries (weak-shareholder-protection countries) have a positive effect on 
investee firms’ tax avoidance, but this result is not statistically significant. The results support 
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the idea that FIIs’ home-country governance practices (shareholder protection) are another 
plausible mechanism through which FIIs affect their investee firms’ tax avoidance.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
We further split the sample into two subsamples: investee firms in civil-law countries 
and investee firms in common-law countries. We find that FIIs have a significantly negative 
effect on tax avoidance only for investee firms located in civil-law countries, and this negative 
effect is driven by FIIs from common-law countries. The result suggests that only FIIs from 
countries with strong shareholder protection affect tax avoidance of investee firms located in 
countries with weak shareholder protection. The result further confirms that the relative 
strength of shareholder protection between a FII’s home country and its investee firm’s home 
country matters. 
Overall, our cross-sectional variation tests in Tables 8 and 9 support that FIIs affect 
corporate tax avoidance through channels of tax morale and shareholder protection. Our results 
also suggest that FIIs’ effect on corporate tax avoidance is not homogenous, and it depends on 
the relative strength of tax morale and shareholder protection between FIIs’ home countries 
and their investee firms’ home countries. 
 
4.4. Additional Tests 
4.4.1. Corruption Norms as an Alternative Explanation 
DeBacker et al. (2015) find that corporations with owners from countries with higher 
corruption norms avoid more tax in the U.S. An alternative explanation of our finding is that 
FIIs affect tax avoidance through the channel of corruption norms instead of tax norms. It 
should be pointed out that when we add both Anti-Corruption and Ln(Tax Morale Index) to the 
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baseline regression model together with other country characteristics, we find both coefficients 
are significant (the coefficient on Anti-Corruption is -0.143 with t-value of -3.84, and the 
coefficient on Ln(Tax Morale Index) is -0.065 with t-value of -2.13) as shown in Table 4 
Column (8). These results indicate that corruption and tax morale are different constructs, 
although they both affect tax avoidance.  
To further mitigate this concern, we conduct an additional test. Specifically, we use an 
index measuring a country’s freedom from corruption (Anti-Corruption) obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation and separate countries into high- and low-corruption countries based on 
the median value. We then separate FIIs into four groups: FIIs from countries with high tax 
morale and high corruption, FIIs from countries with high tax morale and low corruption, FIIs 
from countries with low tax morale and high corruption, and FIIs from countries with low tax 
morale and low corruption. Then, we run a regression of tax avoidance on these four variables 
of FIIs together with same control variables and fixed effects used in our baseline model. The 
results are reported in Table 10. We find that only coefficients on FIIs from countries with high 
tax morale and low corruption and FIIs from countries with high tax morale and high corruption 
are significantly negative. These results indicate that regardless of corruption levels of FIIs’ 
home countries, it is FIIs’ home-country tax morale that drives the decrease in their investee 
firms’ tax avoidance. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
4.4.2. Investment Horizon and Tax Avoidance 
Khurana and Moser (2013) find that long-term institutional ownership is negatively 
associated with tax avoidance. Their evidence is broadly consistent with existing institutional 
ownership literature showing that investors with long-term institutional ownership care more 
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about the investee firms’ long-term value creation (e.g., Bushee 2001). We also argue that long-
term institutional investors put more efforts in monitoring their investee firms and their norms 
and governance practices are more likely to be reflected in corporate decisions. Therefore, we 
further examine how FIIs’ investment horizon affects the relation between FIIs and tax 
avoidance. 
In Table 11, our main variable of interest is foreign institutional ownership, partitioned 
by investment horizon: Forown_Long and Forown_Short. We also partition domestic 
institutional ownership by investment horizon for additional insights. We find long-term 
foreign institutional ownership (Forown_Long) exhibits significantly negative coefficients at 
the 1% level, but short-term foreign institutional ownership (Forown_Short) is not significantly 
related to TaxAvoid. In addition, long-term domestic institutional ownership (Domown_Long) 
exhibits a significantly negative coefficient at the 5% level, whereas short-term domestic 
institutional ownership (Domown_Short) is significantly and positively related to TaxAvoid at 
the 5% level. The results are consistent with Khurana and Moser (2013) and demonstrate that 
FIIs’ investment horizon also matters to their impact on corporate tax avoidance. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
4.4.3. Other Additional Tests  
Finally, we conduct a set of additional analyses. Richupan (1984), Gillis (1989), and 
Bird and de Jantscher (1992) find empirical evidence that economic development is highly 
associated with tax morale. In Table 12 Panel A, we use a country’s economic development as 
an alternative proxy for tax morale. We find that FIIs from developed countries have a 
significantly negative impact on tax avoidance of the investee firms located in developing 
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countries, and DIIs have a significantly negative impact on tax avoidance of the investee firms 
located in developed countries, consistent with the tax morale results. 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
In Panel B, we further examine the effect of FIIs on aggressive tax avoidance. Since 
our tax morale measure is constructed from WVS questionnaire on the acceptance of “cheating 
on taxes”, one may argue that the concept of tax morale and tax avoidance measurement used 
in this paper do not match. To mitigate this concern, we conduct a sensitivity test to examine 
the impact of FIIs’ home-country tax morale on aggressive tax avoidance. Similar to Donohoe 
and Knechel (2014), we rank tax avoidance by country, industry, and year. TaxAggressive 
equals 1 if the observation is in the top tercile and 0 otherwise. We continue to find that FIIs, 
especially FIIs from countries with high tax morale, have a significantly negative impact on 
aggressive tax avoidance.  
In Panel C, we restrict our analysis to G20 member nations, which represent more than 
75% of world trade and 85% of global GDP. By exclusively examining G20 members, we 
ensure our findings are economically important. Moreover, we want to show our findings are 
robust to alternative high- and low-tax-morale countries. In Panel D, we further dissect high-
tax-morale FIIs into US and non-US FIIs to see if the negative impact of high-tax-morale 
(common-law) FIIs on tax avoidance is dominated by US FIIs. One may argue that US has a 
strong impact on economy worldwide. Our results may only be driven by FIIs from US. The 
result shows that both US and non-US high-tax-morale (common-law) FIIs are negatively 
associated with tax avoidance in the full sample and in the subsample of low-tax-morale (civil-
law) countries; and non-US high-tax-morale (common-law) FIIs’ effect is larger in both 
magnitude and significance. Collectively, our main findings are robust to these additional tests. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The importance of FIIs in global financial markets has been rising rapidly. In this paper, 
we examine whether and how FIIs affect their investee firms’ corporate tax avoidance. We 
report robust evidence that FIIs negatively affect their investee firms’ tax avoidance. To 
mitigate endogeneity concerns, we provide a series of analyses (e.g., difference-in-differences 
tests and 2SLS test with IV) to identify the causal effect of FIIs on their investee firms’ 
corporate tax avoidance. 
Moreover, we provide evidence to support that FIIs affect corporate tax avoidance 
through two plausible mechanisms: FIIs’ home-country tax morale and their home-country 
shareholder protection. Furthermore, we find that the extent of tax morale and shareholder 
protection in the country where the investee firms are located also matters.  
Our paper contributes to the tax avoidance literature by establishing a direct effect of 
FIIs on investee firms’ tax avoidance. It complements the literature on how corporate 
ownership structures affect tax avoidance and furthers our understanding of the determinants 
of tax avoidance from the global market perspective. This paper also extends the literature on 
how social norms affect tax avoidance. We find that social norms, in particular tax morale, can 
spillover from FIIs’ home countries to their investee firms. Furthermore, our paper contributes 
to the literature by illustrating FIIs’ active role in corporate policies. Given the increasing 
concerns about corporate tax avoidance from regulators and policymakers internationally, our 
results have important implications for regulators, policymakers, and investors in the global 
financial market. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on our sample of 47,749 firm-year observations for the period 
from 2000 to 2008. TaxAvoid is annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country 
statutory tax rate minus cash effective tax rate. Totown is total institutional ownership. Forown is 
aggregate foreign institutional ownership. Forown_HighMorale (Forown_LowMorale) is aggregate 
ownership of foreign institutional investors whose home countries are classified as having high (low) 
tax morale. Forown_CommonLaw (Forown_CivilLaw) is aggregate ownership of foreign institutional 
investors whose home countries are classified as common-law (civil-law) countries.  Forown_Long 
(Forown_Short) is aggregate ownership of long-term (short-term) foreign institutional investors. 
Domown is aggregate domestic institutional ownership. Domown_Long (Domown_Short) is aggregate 
ownership of long-term (short-term) domestic institutional investors. Assets measures a firm’s book 
value of assets at the end of fiscal year. Leverage is book value of debts scaled by assets. ROA is 
operating income scaled by assets. Sales Growth is the growth rate of sales year to year. R&D is research 
and development expenditure scaled by lagged assets. Accrual is residual obtained from the 
discretionary accrual model (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005). Tax Rate is a country’s statutory tax 
rate. Foreign Operations is an indicator that equals 1 if a firm has nonzero foreign sales and 0 otherwise. 
Appendix A contains detailed definitions of the variables.  
 
Variable Name N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
TaxAvoid 47,749 0.053 0.062 0.231 -0.014 0.190 
Totown 47,749 0.094 0.051 0.115 0.012 0.133 
Forown 47,749 0.047 0.016 0.072 0.003 0.061 
Forown_HighMorale 47,749 0.030 0.009 0.050 0.001 0.037 
Forown_LowMorale 47,749 0.017 0.002 0.034 0.000 0.019 
Forown_CommonLa
w 
47,74
9 
0.0359 0.0105 0.0591 0.0015 0.0456 
Forown_CivilLaw 
47,74
9 
0.0098 0.0007 0.0218 0.0000 0.0100 
Forown_Long 47,749 0.035 0.011 0.057 0.002 0.045 
Forown_Short 47,749 0.011 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.012 
Domown 47,749 0.048 0.014 0.084 0.000 0.056 
Domown_Long 47,749 0.030 0.004 0.060 0.000 0.031 
Domown_Short 47,749 0.018 0.002 0.047 0.000 0.018 
Assets ($ in million) 47,749 
2367.63
0 
313.74
7 
10291.000 111.916 1033.740 
Leverage 47,749 0.202 0.183 0.165 0.052 0.316 
ROA 47,749 0.061 0.046 0.055 0.023 0.083 
Sales Growth 47,749 0.171 0.093 0.380 0.009 0.230 
R&D 47,749 0.011 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.008 
Accruals 47,749 0.049 0.062 0.221 -0.008 0.133 
Tax Rate 47,749 0.321 0.330 0.071 0.280 0.392 
Foreign Operations 47,749 0.477 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
MSCI Inclusion 47,749 0.106 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.000 
CivilLaw 47,749 0.687 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
EconDevelop 47,749 0.686 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
GovEffect 47,749 1.246 1.425 0.643 1.053 1.719 
Accountability 47,749 0.768 0.951 0.743 0.513 1.309 
RegQuality 47,749 1.055 1.141 0.647 0.746 1.584 
Anti-Corruption 42,498 67.060 71.000 20.152 58.000 83.000 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics by Country 
 
This table presents tax avoidance and institutional ownership by country. TaxAvoid is average tax 
avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate minus cash effective tax rate at 
year t for each country. Totown is average total institutional ownership in each country. Forown is 
average aggregate foreign institutional ownership in each country. Domown is average aggregate 
domestic institutional ownership in each country. Tax Morale Index is the percentage of the individual-
level tax morale scores in a given country, obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS). 
 
Country N TaxAvoid Forown Domown 
TaxMorale 
Index 
CivilLaw EconDevelop 
   Panel A. High-Tax-Morale Group   
Argentina 142 -0.017  0.008  0.000  0.766  1 0 
Australia 1,832 0.025  0.039  0.018  0.658  0 1 
Switzerland 929 -0.005  0.094  0.066  0.617  1 1 
Chile 328 -0.011  0.010  0.007  0.661  1 0 
Spain 628 0.053  0.054  0.042  0.637  1 1 
Hong Kong 2,351 0.024  0.052  0.022  0.613  0 1 
Indonesia 463 0.025  0.049  0.000  0.786  1 0 
Italy 927 -0.092  0.059  0.023  0.609  1 1 
Japan 13,289 0.048  0.028  0.030  0.819  1 1 
Korea 1,885 -0.037  0.067  0.002  0.715  1 0 
Mexico 322 0.068  0.067  0.006  0.647  1 0 
Netherlands 512 0.021  0.158  0.049  0.616  1 1 
New Zealand 345 0.024  0.029  0.008  0.603  0 1 
Pakistan 202 0.092  0.008  0.018  0.767  0 0 
Singapore 1,300 0.006  0.041  0.011  0.587  0 1 
Taiwan 2,629 0.241  0.045  0.001  0.632  1 0 
Mean (A)   0.047  0.042  0.023        
   Panel B. Low-Tax-Morale Group   
Brazil 501 0.047  0.081  0.005  0.518  1 0 
China 2,188 0.238  0.066  0.078  0.581  1 0 
Germany 2,173 0.039  0.073  0.056  0.290  1 1 
Finland 598 0.002  0.108  0.091  0.560  1 1 
France 2,447 0.038  0.055  0.041  0.481  1 1 
Israel 286 0.018  0.036  0.000  0.000  0 0 
India 2,291 0.098  0.042  0.057  0.501  0 0 
Malaysia 1,605 0.045  0.025  0.010  0.402  0 0 
Norway 424 0.053  0.096  0.111  0.493  1 1 
Peru 98 -0.111  0.012  0.000  0.397  1 0 
Philippines 225 0.099  0.048  0.000  0.408  1 0 
Poland 693 -0.037  0.029  0.166  0.527  1 0 
Sweden 956 0.021  0.071  0.160  0.542  1 1 
Thailand 669 0.075  0.038  0.007  0.495  0 0 
Turkey 460 0.006  0.057  0.000  0.558  1 0 
United Kingdom 4,051 0.020  0.039  0.177  0.563  0 1 
Mean (B)   0.061  0.053  0.083        
Mean Difference (A – B)   -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.060***       
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Table 3 
Foreign Institutional Ownership and Tax Avoidance 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is TaxAvoid, the 
annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate minus cash effective 
tax rate at year t. Totown is total institutional ownership. Domown is aggregate domestic institutional 
ownership. Forown is aggregate foreign institutional ownership. Appendix A provides detailed 
definitions of the control variables. Industry, country, and year dummies are included, but coefficients 
are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
Totown -0.042***  
 (-3.23)  
Forown  -0.080*** 
  (-3.98) 
Domown  -0.007 
  (-0.44) 
Ln(Size) 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (5.81) (6.21) 
Leverage 0.064*** 0.063*** 
 (6.98) (6.86) 
ROA 0.796*** 0.802*** 
 (24.17) (24.27) 
Sales Growth 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (6.48) (6.53) 
R&D 0.060 0.066 
 (1.06) (1.15) 
Accrual -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.06) (-0.17) 
Tax Rate 0.576*** 0.594*** 
 (7.73) (7.93) 
Foreign Operations 0.002 0.002 
 (0.64) (0.61) 
Constant -0.339*** -0.349*** 
 (-8.87) (-9.07) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Country FE YES YES 
Observations 47,749 47,749 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.131 
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Table 4 
Country Characteristics 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is TaxAvoid, the annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-
country statutory tax rate minus cash effective tax rate at year t. CivilLaw is an indicator that equals 1 if a country’s legal system is based on civil law and 0 if 
common law. GovEffect measures perceptions of the quality of public services as well as the quality of the civil services and the degree of its independence 
from political pressure. RegQuality measures perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. Accountability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression. EconDevelop is an indicator that equals 1 if a country is classified as a developed country and 0 otherwise. Anti-
Corruption measures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The natural logarithm of tax morale index (Ln(Tax Morale 
Index)) is obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS). Firm characteristics variables, industry and year dummies, and interaction terms between year and 
country are included, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
Forown -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.084*** -0.092*** -0.091*** 
 (-4.68) (-4.16) (-4.14) (-3.80) (-4.05) (-4.14) (-5.10) (-4.27) 
CivilLaw -0.002       -0.004 
 (-0.37)       (-0.45) 
GovEffect  -0.125***      0.133*** 
  (-8.46)      (2.00) 
RegQuality   -0.193***     -0.025 
   (-12.32)     (-0.55) 
Accountability    -0.166***    -0.183*** 
    (-20.23)    (-14.07) 
EconDevelop     -0.062***   0.079*** 
     (-10.00)   (3.81) 
Anti-Corruption      -0.088***  -0.143*** 
      (-9.31)  (-3.84) 
Ln(Tax Morale Index)       -0.048** -0.065** 
       (-2.50) (-2.13) 
Domown 0.001 -0.003 -0.013 0.004 -0.003 -0.012 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.72) (0.22) (-0.17) (-0.66) (-0.28) (-0.46) 
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Constant -0.137*** 0.006 0.237*** 0.170*** -0.089** 0.254*** -0.151*** 0.623*** 
 (-3.15) (1.38) (4.83) (3.72) (-2.09) (4.30) (-3.51) (6.13) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 47,749 47,749 47,749 47,749 47,749 42,498 47,463 42,212 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.124 0.127 0.134 0.125 0.0906 0.123 0.101 
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Table 5 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Model 
 
To address potential endogenous bias, we use 2SLS model with MSCI Inclusion as the instrumental 
variable for foreign institutional ownership. MSCI Inclusion equals 1 if a given firm is included in MSCI 
in a given year t and 0 otherwise. We then regress tax avoidance on predicted foreign institutional 
ownership (Pred_Forown) from first-stage regression. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed 
using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Forown TaxAvoid 
  1st Stage 2nd Stage 
MSCI Inclusion 0.044***  
 (17.01)  
Pred_Forown  -0.241*** 
  (-2.60) 
Domown 0.012 -0.006 
 (1.61) (-0.36) 
Ln(Size) 0.014*** 0.009*** 
 (31.74) (4.61) 
Leverage -0.020*** 0.059*** 
 (-5.55) (6.32) 
ROA 0.142*** 0.830*** 
 (12.73) (22.29) 
Sales Growth 0.006*** 0.024*** 
 (7.09) (6.68) 
R&D 0.170*** 0.096 
 (6.53) (1.60) 
Accrual 0.008*** -0.001 
 (4.58) (-0.12) 
Tax Rate 0.048* 0.604*** 
 (1.92) (8.05) 
Foreign Operations 0.002 0.003 
 (1.16) (0.78) 
Constant -0.133*** -0.370*** 
 (-11.13) (-8.69) 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Country FE YES YES 
Observations 47,749 47,749 
Adjusted R2 0.315 0.130 
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Table 6 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Reform in China 
and Tax Avoidance 
 
This table presents results of the difference-in-differences regression that examines the effect of China’s 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) reform in 2002 on tax avoidance. It provides results 
from four pooled OLS regressions. Post-Reform is an indicator that equals 1 (0) for years after (before) 
the 2002 reform. China is an indicator that equals 1 if the investee firms are located in China and 0 
otherwise. China*Reform captures the incremental post-reform effect in China. Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
  Low-Tax-Morale Emerging Civil-Law 
Low-Tax-Morale, Emerging,  
and Civil-Law 
Post-Reform 0.031*** 0.027* 0.038*** 0.069* 
 (3.59) (1.92) (5.21) (1.83) 
China 0.186*** 0.336*** 0.331*** 0.127*** 
 (4.97) (7.46) (6.97) (2.79) 
China* Post-Reform -0.040* -0.053** -0.043* -0.067* 
 (-1.71) (-2.12) (-1.86) (-1.83) 
Ln(Size) 0.007** -0.001 0.008*** -0.003 
 (2.53) (-0.14) (3.70) (-0.24) 
Leverage 0.069** 0.124*** 0.028 0.105 
 (2.28) (3.10) (1.33) (1.18) 
ROA 0.758*** 1.004*** 0.687*** 0.499** 
 (7.66) (6.86) (7.15) (2.12) 
Sales Growth 0.014 -0.001 0.013 -0.008 
 (1.29) (-0.07) (1.42) (-0.36) 
R&D -0.174 -0.611** -0.160 -0.009 
 (-1.45) (-1.98) (-1.22) (-0.01) 
Accrual -0.045** -0.011 -0.014 -0.002 
 (-2.36) (-0.45) (-0.76) (-0.06) 
Tax Rate 0.747*** 0.514 0.830*** 0.306 
 (3.36) (1.34) (3.82) (0.68) 
Foreign Operations -0.015 -0.010 0.002 -0.026 
 (-1.37) (-0.70) (0.26) (-0.70) 
Constant -0.329*** -0.365** -0.502*** -0.088 
 (-3.76) (-2.57) (-5.64) (-0.51) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,891 2,105 7,338 431 
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.182 0.0939 0.126 
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Table 7 
The Effect of Significant Changes in Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance  
 
This table presents results of the difference-in-differences regression that examines the effect of a 
significant change in foreign (domestic) institutional ownership on tax avoidance. The dependent 
variable is TaxAvoid, the annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax 
rate minus the cash effective tax rate at year t. IncFor (IncDom) is an indicator that equals 1 if foreign 
(domestic) institutional ownership increases by at least one standard deviation and 0 otherwise. Post is 
an indicator that equals 1 for years after foreign (domestic) institutional ownership increases by at least 
one standard deviation and 0 otherwise. Firm characteristics variables, as well as industry, country, and 
year dummies, are included, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
Post -0.007  -0.023**  0.003  -0.009  
 (-0.85) (-2.34) (0.39) (-0.93) 
IncFor 0.028***   0.010   
 (3.43)  (1.32)  
Post* IncFor -0.025**   -0.019**   
 (-2.51)  (-1.97)  
IncDom  0.038***   0.011  
  (3.73)  (-0.93) 
Post*IncDom  -0.034***   -0.002  
  (-2.61)  (-0.18) 
Constant -0.379***  0.040***  -0.379***  -0.532***  
 (-5.83) (5.42) (-5.83) (-5.66) 
Controls NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 7,207 5,849 7,207 5,849 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.011 0.179 0.194 
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Table 8 
Mechanism 1: Tax Morale and Tax Avoidance 
 
This table presents the results of our first mechanism, tax morale. The dependent variable is TaxAvoid, 
the annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate minus the cash 
effective tax rate at year t. Forown_HighMorale (Forown_LowMorale) is aggregate ownership of 
foreign institutional investors whose home countries are classified as high-(low-)tax-morale countries. 
We further bisect the full sample into two subsamples: investee firms in countries with low tax morale 
and investee firms in countries with high tax morale, and we repeat the test. Firm characteristics 
variables, as well as industry, country, and year dummies, are included, but coefficients are omitted for 
brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Full Sample Low-Tax-Morale  High-Tax-Morale  Low-Tax-Morale  High-Tax-Morale  
Forown  -0.131*** 0.011   
  (-4.54) (0.44)   
Forown_HighMorale -0.150***   -0.246*** -0.022 
 (-5.20)   (-5.86) (-0.59) 
Forown_LowMorale 0.048   0.069 0.077 
 (1.16)   (1.23) (1.15) 
Domown -0.012 0.014 -0.158*** 0.008 -0.163*** 
 (-0.70) (0.69) (-3.78) (0.39) (-3.84) 
Constant -0.354*** -0.269*** -0.464*** -0.274*** -0.468*** 
 (-9.19) (-6.17) (-8.44) (-6.29) (-8.48) 
  H0: Forown [(2)= (3)] H0: Forown_HighMorale [(4)= (5)] 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
   H0: Forown_LowMorale [(4)= (5)] 
   (0.6726) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 47,749 19,665 28,084 28,084 27,995 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.107 0.155 0.108 0.155 
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Table 9 
Mechanism 2: Shareholder Protection and Tax Avoidance 
 
This table presents results of our second mechanism, shareholder protection. The dependent variable is 
TaxAvoid, the annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate minus 
its cash effective tax rate at year t. Forown_CommonLaw (Forown_CivilLaw) is aggregate ownership 
of foreign institutional investors whose home countries are classified as common-law (civil-law) 
countries. We further bisect the full sample into two subsamples: investee firms in civil-law countries 
and investee firms in common-law countries, and we repeat the test. Firm characteristics variables, as 
well as industry, country, and year dummies, are included, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Full Sample Civil Law Common Law Civil Law Common Law 
Forown  -0.116*** 0.040   
  (-5.04) (1.08)   
Forown_CommonLaw -0.113***   -0.163*** 0.037 
 (-4.68)   (-5.82) (0.80) 
Forown_CivilLaw 0.071   0.085 0.061 
 (1.06)   (1.13) (0.43) 
Domown -0.009 0.026 -0.074** 0.023 -0.074** 
 (-0.55) (1.50) (-2.12) (1.31) (-2.12) 
Constant -0.351*** -0.367*** -0.236*** -0.370*** -0.236*** 
 (-9.12) (-8.86) (-3.81) (-8.94) (-3.79) 
  H0: Forown [(2)= (3)] H0: Forown_CommonLaw [(4)= (5)] 
  (0.0004) (0.0002) 
   H0: Forown_CivilLaw [(4)= (5)] 
   (0.8837) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE  YES YES YES YES 
Country FE  YES YES YES YES 
Observations 47,749 32,817 14,932 32,817 14,932 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.159 0.0774 0.159 0.0773 
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Table 10 
Corruption and Tax Avoidance 
 
This table presents regression result of corruption and tax avoidance. The dependent variable is 
TaxAvoid, the annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate minus 
the cash effective tax rate at year t. Forown_HighCrpt_HighMoral (Forown_LowCrpt_HighMoral) is 
aggregate ownership of foreign institutional investors from high-corruption and high-tax-morale (low-
corruption and high-tax-morale) countries. Forown_HighCrpt_LowMoral 
(Forown_LowCrpt_LowMoral) is aggregate ownership of foreign institutional investors from high-
corruption and low-tax-morale (low-corruption and low-tax-morale) countries. Domown is aggregate 
ownership of domestic institutional investors. Firm characteristics variables, as well as industry, country, 
and year dummies are included, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) 
 Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
  Full Sample 
Forown_HighCrpt_HighMoral -0.111*** 
 (-2.87) 
Forown_LowCrpt_HighMoral -0.200*** 
 (-4.98) 
Forown_LowCrpt_LowMoral 0.091** 
 (2.03) 
Forown_HighCrpt_LowMoral -0.285 
 (-1.42) 
Domown -0.014 
 (-0.81) 
Constant -0.354*** 
 (-9.19) 
Controls  YES 
Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Country FE YES 
Observations 47,749 
Adjusted R2 0.132 
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Table 11 
Investment Horizon and Tax Avoidance 
 
This table presents regression result of investment horizon and tax avoidance. The dependent variable 
is TaxAvoid, the annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate 
minus the cash effective tax rate at year t. Forown_Long (Forown_Short) is aggregate ownership of 
long-term (short-term) foreign institutional investors. Domown_Long (Domown_Short) is aggregate 
ownership of long-term (short-term) domestic institutional investors. Firm characteristics variables, as 
well as industry, country, and year dummies are included, but coefficients are omitted for brevity. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Full Sample 
Forown_Long -0.094*** 
 (-3.36) 
Forown_Short -0.021 
 (-0.40) 
Domown_Long -0.067** 
 (-2.40) 
Domown_Short 0.059** 
 (2.39) 
Constant -0.362*** 
 (-9.28) 
Controls YES 
Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Country FE YES 
Observations 47,749 
Adjusted R2 0.132 
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Table 12 
Other Additional Analyses 
 
This table presents results of four other additional analyses. Panel A uses a country’s economic 
development as an alternative proxy for tax morale. Panel B investigates tax aggressiveness instead of 
tax avoidance. Panel C uses sample that only retains members of the Group of Twenty (G20). Panel D 
further splits FIIs (e.g., Forown_HighMorale) into US FIIs (e.g., Forown_HighMorale_USt) and non-
US FIIs (e.g., Forown_HighMorale_Others). All analyses include control variables (firm 
characteristics as well as year, industry, and country dummies) used in the baseline model but omitted 
for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at 
the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Alternative Tax Morale: Economic Development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Emerging Developed Emerging Developed Emerging Developed 
Totown -0.074*** -0.029*     
 (-3.94) (-1.68)     
Domown   0.028 -0.054** 0.028 -0.054** 
   (1.52) (-2.07) (1.53) (-2.07) 
Forown   -0.172*** -0.003   
   (-5.82) (-0.13)   
Forown_Developed     -0.173*** -0.002 
     (-5.80) (-0.10) 
Forown_Emerging     0.018 -0.070 
     (0.06) (-0.29) 
Constant -0.228*** -0.344*** -0.288*** -0.346*** -0.289*** -0.346*** 
 (-5.16) (-9.05) (-6.36) (-9.08) (-6.36) (-9.07) 
Observations 15,502 35,034 15,502 35,034 15,502 35,034 
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.0592 0.237 0.0593 0.237 0.0593 
 
 
Panel B. Alternative Tax Avoidance Measure: Tax Aggressiveness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAggressive 
 Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
Totown -0.685***    
 (-7.20)    
Domown  -0.944*** -0.951*** -0.944*** 
  (-7.37) (-7.42) (-7.36) 
Forown  -0.414***   
  (-2.89)   
Forown_HighMorale   -0.543**  
   (-2.53)  
Forown_LowMorale   -0.191  
   (-0.65)  
Forown_CommonLaw    -0.439** 
    (-2.40) 
Forown_CivilLaw    -0.404 
    (-0.97) 
Constant -1.602*** -1.559*** -1.566*** -1.561*** 
 (-6.26) (-6.08) (-6.11) (-6.09) 
Observations 47,724 47,724 47,724 47,724 
Pseudo R2 0.0443 0.0445 0.0445 0.0297 
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Panel C. G20 Countries Only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
Totown -0.046***    
 (-3.07)    
Domown  -0.010 -0.016 -0.012 
  (-0.52) (-0.89) (-0.67) 
Forown  -0.094***   
  (-3.90)   
Forown_HighMorale   -0.207***  
   (-6.06)  
Forown_LowMorale   0.112**  
   (2.35)  
Forown_CommonLaw    -0.145*** 
    (-4.97) 
Forown_CivilLaw    0.138* 
    (1.93) 
Constant -0.363*** -0.375*** -0.382*** -0.377*** 
 (-8.64) (-8.85) (-9.03) (-8.90) 
Observations 36,358 36,358 36,358 36,358 
Pseudo R2 0.0942 0.0944 0.0947 0.0947 
 
 
Panel D. US vs. Non-US Institutional Investors 
  (1) (2) 
  Dependent variable: TaxAvoid 
 Full Sample Full Sample 
Domown -0.013 -0.009 
 (-0.77) (-0.55) 
Forown_HighMorale_US -0.079*  
 (-1.92)  
Forown_HighMorale_Others -0.253***  
 (-5.07)  
Forown_LowMorale 0.039  
 (0.92)  
Forown_CommonLaw_US  -0.068* 
  (-1.67) 
Forown_CommonLaw_Others  -0.157*** 
  (-4.03) 
Forown_CivilLaw  0.074 
  (1.09) 
Constant -0.354*** -0.350*** 
 (-9.18) (-9.09) 
Observations 47,749 47,749 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.132 
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Appendix A 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable Name Description and Sources 
TaxAvoid 
Annual tax avoidance spread measured as a firm’s home-country statutory tax rate less 
cash effective tax rate. Cash effective tax rate = (Pretax earnings – Current cash tax 
paid)/ Pretax earnings. If the current cash tax paid is missing, we replace it with total tax 
expense less current deferred tax (Atwood et al. 2012). A country’s statutory tax rate is 
collected from the OECD and KPMG LLP websites. [Source: Global Compustat] 
Totown Total institutional ownership for firm i at year t. [Source: FactSet/LionShares] 
Forown 
Aggregate ownership of foreign institutional investors. An institutional investor is 
classified as foreign when its headquarter is located in a different country from that of 
its investee firm. [Source: FactSet/LionShares] 
Domown Aggregate ownership of domestic institutional investors. [Source: FactSet/LionShares] 
Forown_HighMorale 
(Forown_LowMorale) 
Aggregate ownership of foreign institutional investors whose home countries are 
classified as high- (low-)-tax-morale countries. [Source: FactSet/LionShares] High 
(low) tax morale of a country is defined by that country’s tax morale score being greater 
(lower) than the median value. The tax morale index is constructed from the World 
Values Survey (WVS). Data are available at the webpage via 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp  
Forown_CommonLaw 
(Forown_CivilLaw) 
Aggregate ownership of foreign institutional investors whose home countries are 
classified as common-law (civil-law) countries. [Source: FactSet/LionShares] 
Forown_Long 
(Forown_Short) 
Aggregate ownership of long-term (short-term) foreign institutional investors. Long-
term and short-term investment horizon are based on an institutional investor’s turnover 
rate. If an institutional investor’s turnover rate is lower (higher) than its median value, it 
is classified as long-term (short-term) institutional investors. [Source: 
FactSet/LionShares] 
Domown_Long(Domown
_Short) 
Aggregate ownership of long-term (short-term) domestic institutional investors. 
[Source: FactSet/LionShares] 
Tax Rate Statutory tax rate for a country j at year t. [Source: the OECD, KPMG LLP websites] 
Assets Book value of assets (in US$ million) at the end of year t. [Source: Global Compustat] 
Leverage Book value of debts scaled by assets ((dlcc + dlt)/at). [Source: Global Compustat] 
ROA Operating income scaled by assets (EBIT/at). [Source: Global Compustat] 
Sales Growth Annual sales’ growth rate ((Salet/Salet–1 ) – 1). [Source: Global Compustat] 
R&D Research and development expenditure scaled by assets. [Source: Global Compustat] 
Accrual 
Discretionary accruals measured as residuals from the discretionary accrual model 
(Kothari et al. 2005). [Source: Global Compustat] 
Foreign Operations 
An indicator that equals 1 if a firm has nonzero foreign sales and 0 otherwise. [Source: 
WorldScope] 
MSCI Inclusion 
An indicator that equals 1 if a firm’s stock is included in the MSCI index in a given year 
t, and 0 otherwise. http://www.msci.com/products/indexes 
Accountability 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media (–2.5 (worst) ≤ Value ≤ +2.5(best)).[Source: World Governance 
Indicators] 
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RegQuality 
Reflects perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development (–
2.5(worst) ≤ Value ≤ +2.5(best)).[Source: World Governance Indicators] 
GovEffect 
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil services and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies (–2.5(worst) ≤ Value ≤ +2.5(best)).[Source: World Governance Indicators] 
CivilLaw 
An indicator that equals 1 if a country’s legal system is based on civil law, and 0 if 
common law. [Source: La Porta et al. (1998)] 
Anti-Corruption 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that reflects how much a country’s public sectors 
are corrupted (0(most corrupted) ≤ Value ≤ +100(lease corrupted)). [Source: Heritage 
Foundation] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
